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I. INTRODUCTION
American parentage laws have evolved in the past half-century as a
result of major changes in both reproductive technologies and human
conduct. Yet the legal evolution, if not revolution, has not kept pace so
that today many parentage laws are outdated. With the (r)evolution
t Professor Emeritus, Northern Illinois College of Law. B.A., 1970, phi beta kappa,
Colby College; J.D., 1974, University of Chicago Law School.
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incomplete, state courts may, via common law rulings, update. Yet courts
are frequently hesitant because general assembly leadership is preferred.'
State legislators are challenged when contemplating new parentage
laws, as the goals of protecting constitutional rights; promoting certainty;
recognizing the import of blood ties; furthering children's best interests;
respecting family members' wishes; preserving healthy parent-child,
parental-like, and familial relationships; and enhancing public welfare
often cannot be simultaneously pursued. Congress is unlikely to demand
national uniformity, if not perfection, as parentage, like many family law
matters, is primarily reserved to the states.
This Article will first reflect briefly on recent changes in technology
and conduct. Then it will examine the boundaries of American state
parentage laws established by the federal and state constitutions. Next, it
will explore the diverse array of existing and proposed state parentage
1. See, e.g., Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 219 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)
("By deferring to the Legislature in matters involving complex social and policy
ramifications far beyond the facts of the particular case, we are not telling the parties that
the issues they raise are unworthy of legal recognition. To the contrary, we intend only to
illustrate the limitations of the courts in fashioning a comprehensive solution to such a
complex and socially significant issue."); McAllister v. McAllister, 779 N.W.2d 652, 662
(N.D. 2010) (Crothers, J., concurring) ("I write separately to express concern that our
body of law being propagated ad judicum has resulted, and will continue to result, in the
judiciary being pulled deep into the legislature's policymaking domain."). When a
general assembly has exercised partial leadership (as by explicitly addressing a topic, like
surrogacy, in only some settings), some courts will not act without further legislative
guidance, as with In re Marriage of Mancine, 965 N.E.2d 592, 596 (111. App. Ct 2012)
(finding that former stepparent visitation outside the express statutory guidelines is not
available), while other courts will develop common law "until the legislature instructs
otherwise," as with In re Baby, No. M2012-01040-COA-R3-JV, 2013 WL 245039, at
*3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2013), appeal granted May 17, 2013 (upholding surrogacy
pact between unwed opposite-sex couple who later married even though surrogacy statute
covered "biological father and the biological father's wife").
2. As Professor Katherine K. Baker has observed,
It seems clear that the time has come for the law to choose the relative
weight it gives to the qualities of parenthood that accompany a
bionormative regime. A premium on biology is not mandated by history,
evolutionary theory, or morality, but a premium on biology does bring
with it attributes that may have real value, and different attributes have
different value for different constituencies. Contemporary living patterns
demand some sort of change, but any change will come with costs to some
and maybe even costs to all. The policy priorities in this area are not easy
or obvious, but they should be defined in recognition of the consequences
that are likely to follow.
Katherine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV.
649, 715 (2008).
3. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (finding that regulation of
domestic relations rests within the "virtually exclusive province of the States.").
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laws within these boundaries. Finally, it will highlight key remaining
questions for American state legislators and judges seeking to improve
parentage guidelines in a changing world.4
II. FIFTY YEARS OF CHANGE
A. Reproductive Technology
In the past half century, there have been two major technology
advances prompting parentage law (r)evolution. One involves the
availability of more reliable, less costly, and less intrusive DNA testing
to determine male parentage. Soon, private and/or prebirth testing may
even be generally available.
The second involves the availability of more reliable, less costly, and
generally accessible processes for assisted human reproduction (AHR).6
Births employing AHR, via the use of surrogates, can now be
contemplated even when the intended parents contribute no womb or
genetic material.
Other technological advances have also fueled parentage law
(r)evolution. For example, new processes now permit a prebirth
determination of the sex of any later born child as well as make available
safer intended pregnancy terminations.
B. Human Conduct
As to changes in human conduct, in the past half century there has
been a significant rise in births arising from sex with unwed mothers;7 in
4. Of course, changes in technologies and human conduct present difficult family
law issues extending beyond parentage. See, e.g., Cynthia Grant Bowman, The New
Family: Challenges to American Family Law, 22 C.F.L.Q. 387 (2010) (exploring, e.g.,
support, cohabitation, stepparents, divorce).
5. See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Before Birth, Dad's ID, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2012, at
Bi; Xin Guo et al., A Noninvasive Test to Determine Paternity in Pregnancy, 366 N.
ENG. J. MED 1743, 1743-45 (2012).
6. On the history of AHR (and the recent growth in free private sperm donation), see
Lauren Gill, Note, Who's Your Daddy? Defining Paternity Rights in the Context of Free,
Private Sperm Donation, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1715, 1719-25 (2013). Seemingly,
AHR is increasingly available on a "do-it-yourself basis," making governmental
regulation ever more difficult. See, e.g., A.A.B. v. B.O.C., 112 So. 3d 761, 764 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2013).
7. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 2, at 652 n.9; Elizabeth Wildsmith, Nicole R.
Steward-Streng & Jennifer Manlove, Childbearing Outside of Marriage: Estimates and
Trends in the United States, CHILD TRENDS, Nov. 2011, available at
http://www.childtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ChildTrends-2011_11 01 _RB_
NonmaritalCB.pdf ("In 2009, 41 percent of all births (about 1.7 million) occurred outside
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the numbers of unwed mothers who raise their children alone;8 in the
numbers of newborns who have no fathers listed on their birth
certificates; 9 and in the numbers of stepparents, grandparents, and others
who rear, or help to rear, other people's children upon invitation or other
conduct by biological (actual or presumed) or adoptive parents.10 As
Justice Stevens observed that there is an "almost infinite variety of
family relationships that pervade our ever-changing society."I
Seemingly, there have also been increased numbers of children born
to married women when sex outside of marriage prompted the births as
well as of children born to unmarried women when sex with married men
prompted births. There may even be higher levels of secrecy, and deceit,
regarding possible and actual male biological ties to children born of sex.
Further, there are ever-increasing numbers of children born of AHR.
The women who bear these children need not be intended parents.
Intended mothers may seek to raise their children born of AHR alone or
with their wed or unwed (and often same sex) partners.
With these changes, there are mounting numbers of nontraditional
nuclear families containing children-that is, families where there is no
married heterosexual couple. In particular, there has been an upsurge in
families, including same sex couples, who plan for, have, and rear
children. Additionally, nuclear families, defined herein as including two
adults in an intimate, and usually sexual, relationship who are raising
of marriage, compared with 28 percent of all births in 1990 and just II percent of all
births in 1970.").
8. Jeffrey A. Parness & Zachary Townsend, For Those Not John Edwards: More
and Better Paternity Acknowledgments at Birth, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 53, 55-56 (2010).
Outside the United States, the same pattern often emerges. In Great Britain, see, e.g, One
Million Children Grow Up with No Contact with Their Fathers, Reports Centre for
Social Justice, FAM. L. WEEK, www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=edl 14337 (last
visited Mar. 11, 2014) (reviewing the June 2013 report entitled "Fractured Families,"
produced by The Centre for Social Justice).
9. See, e.g., Jeff Atkinson, Shifts in the Law Regarding the Rights of Third Parties to
Seek Visitation and Custody of Children, 47 FAMILY L.Q. 1, 2 n.4 (2013) (reporting that
in 2012 almost 18 million children were living with mother only, that is, not with the
biological father).
10. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000) ("[W]hile many children
have two married parents and grandparents who visit regularly, many other children are
raised in single family households. .. . Understandably in these single-parent households,
persons outside the nuclear family are called upon with increasing frequency to assist in
the everyday task of childrearing."). Thus, in 2012, almost 1.5 million grandchildren
were "living with their grandparents without the presence of parents." Id. Atkinson, supra
note 9, at 2.
I1. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 90 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also id. at 63 (noting that it is
"difficult to speak of an average American family") (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
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children together, more often come and go so that parents frequently
move with their minor children from one nuclear family into another.
I11. BOUNDARIES OF PARENTAGE LAWS
A. Federal Constitutional Boundaries
American state parentage laws today are significantly guided by
federal constitutional boundaries in U.S. Supreme Court decisions.
While limiting the (r)evolution of parentage laws, these rulings recognize
significant discretion for state lawmakers, resulting in diverse state laws.
While Supreme Court decisions have only explicitly addressed parentage
for children born of sex, the diversity in state court approaches to
parentage extends to children born of AHR (with or without surrogacy).
In Lehr v. Robertson in 1983,12 the Supreme Court ruled that a
biological father of a child born of sex acquires, via Due Process,
"substantial" federal constitutional childrearing interests only after
forming a "significant custodial, personal or financial relationship" with
his child. 13 Prior to formation, a biological father only has a less-
protected parental opportunity interest, meaning, for example, that he has
no right to advance notice of an adoption petition by another person
when this opportunity interest had not been timely seized. 14 By contrast,
a birth mother necessarily has a significant relationship with any child
she bears, so there will always arise substantial childrearing interests 5 at
birth in the absence of a prebirth waiver, be it intentionall 6 or
involuntary.' 7
In Michael H. v. Gerald D. in 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court
narrowed an unwed biological father's federal constitutional parental
opportunity interest when a child is born into a "unitary family"-that is,
a "family unit accorded traditional respect in our society," typified "by
the marital family" as well as by a "household of unmarried parents and
12. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
13. Id. at 261-62.
14. Id. at 250.
15. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 62-63 (2001).
16. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (holding that a husband
and wife whose gametes resulted in an egg carried by a surrogate, per a contract, were the
parents of the child born to the surrogate, with the surrogate having no visitation and no
recognition as a parent).
17. Drug use during pregnancy at times leads to birth mothers having no parental
interests at birth. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Arming the Pregnancy Police: More
Outlandish Concoctions?, 53 LA. L. REV. 427 (1992).
18. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. I10 (1989).
2013] 747
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
their children."19 The Court held that there is no requirement for an
opportunity interest in an unwed biological father of a child born to a
married woman, who raises the child with her husband who is neither
impotent nor sterile. In Michael H., state law recognized a marital
paternity presumption in such a husband whose wife bore a child.20
However, had either the mother or her husband in Michael H. objected to
the husband's presumed legal paternity within two years of the child's
birth, as each could do,21 an opportunity interest to childcare might then
have arisen for the unwed biological father. The relevant state law thus
explicitly allowed the birth mother or her husband, but not the biological
father, to challenge the marital presumption. 22 This approach, however,
need not be followed.
In Troxel v. Granville in 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court determined
that the "substantial" constitutional childrearing interests of established
parents could not be easily overcome when third parties, like
grandparents, seek court-ordered visitation over parental objections.23
The broad delegation of child visitation authority within a state statute
was stricken,24 though it remains unclear whether projected harm to a
19. Id. at 123 n.3.
20. Id. at 117 (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(a) (West 1989)).
21. Id. at 118. But see D.F.H. v. J.D.G., 125 So. 3d 146 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013)
(holding that under ALA. CODE § 26-17-607(a) (1975), biological father cannot intervene
in a presumed father's divorce in order to challenge husband's paternity, as only the
husband can seek to disprove his paternity).
22. Some states do not employ such a scheme because their laws recognize challenge
opportunities for certain biological fathers. Compare K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399 (Ind.
1996) (paternity act), and In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1994) (state constitutional
due course of law guarantee), with Barnes v. Jeudevine, 718 N.W.2d 311, 314 (Mich.
2006) (holding that biological father, who with mother acknowledged paternity with state
register a day after child's birth, cannot challenge paternity of husband whose wife
conceived or bore child during marriage unless "a court has determined that the child was
not the issue of the marriage"), and People v. Zajackowski, 825 N.W.2d 554, 557 (Mich.
2012) (holding that civil presumption of legitimacy favoring blood ties in husband does
not extend to criminal context where blood ties are also important).
23. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 89-91 (2000).
24. In Troxel, six Justices found the Washington statute authorizing court orders
involving grandparent visitation over parental objection unconstitutional, with four
deeming the act unconstitutional as applied and two (in separate concurring opinions)
finding facial invalidity. Id. at 75 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion); id. at 79 (Souter, J.,
concurring); id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
The Troxel opinions left unclear what circumstances can overcome the
"substantial" federal interests of established parents in denying visitation opportunities to
nonparents. The plurality did recognize that a presumption involving fit parents acting in
their children's best interests was embodied in the U.S. Constitution so that "special
weight" always must be accorded to parental desires, though it did not opine-as did the
Washington state high court-that a showing of serious harm or potential serious harm to
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child is needed before third party visitation will be ordered over parental
objection. Based on Troxel, these childrearing interests have also been
found to limit expansive statutory recognitions of parental status for one
person when two fit parents already exist.25 Whether or not there may
only be two recognized parents at any one time, after Troxel there also
remain questions about how parents may cede some or all of their federal
parental interests to nonparents, whether the nonparents are then also
deemed parents26 or simply nonparents with childcare interests, and
regarding so-called third party visitation opportunities.
Beyond Lehr, Michael H., and Troxel, there is the 1983 Supreme
Court ruling in Roe v. Wade.27 There, and in later cases, both prospective
wed and unwed biological fathers were denied any say in certain
decisions regarding pregnancy termination by prospective birth mothers
who were accorded broad, though fettered, 28 decision-making authority
children was necessary to sustain nonparent visitation over parental objection. Id. at 67-
68, 73, 77.
Current grandparent and other third party visitation statutes are reviewed in
Atkinson, supra note 9, at 18.
25. Bancroft v. Jameson, 19 A.3d 730, 750 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2010) (holding that
mother's former boyfriend, who lived with mother and her child for five years, could not
employ the recent de facto parent amendment to Delaware's Uniform Parentage Act, as
its use would violate the federal and state due process rights of the parents, implicitly
suggesting that there can be only two persons at any one time with federal constitutional
parental interests in a single child). Given the lack of a majority in Troxel and Justice
Kennedy's posit that a third party might be deemed a "de facto" parent, this finding is
questionable. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 100-01 (Kennedy, J. dissenting).
26. See, e.g., S.Y. v. S.B., 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d I (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that
former same sex partner of adoptive parent also becomes a parent per statute after
receiving the child into one's home and holding out child as one's own, with statute
deemed constitutional under Troxel--even though each parent acquired parental interests
at different times). See also David D. Meyer, What Constitutional Law Can Learn from
the ALI Principles of Family Dissolution, 2001 BYU L. Rev. 1075, 1077 (stating that
many read Troxel as placing "several of the ALl's directives" on ceding parental interests
to be "in doubt"); id. at 1084-85. But see Robin Fretwell Wilson, Limiting the
Perogatives of Legal Parents: Judicial Skepticism of the American Law Institute's
Treatment of De Facto Parents, 25 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 477, 482 (2013)
(noting concerns about the recognitions of ceded interests when a parent allows a
nonparent to do childcare "chores" and to live in the household for a certain time).
27. 410 U.S. 113 (1983).
28. Id. at 154 ("[S]ome state regulation in areas protected by [right of privacy] is
appropriate."). Seemingly, all "rights of parenthood" are limited. See, e.g., Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1994) ("Acting to guard the general interest in
youth's well-being, the state parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring
school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor, and in many other ways . . .
. [t]he state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in
things affecting the child's welfare."). Parenthood rights of one parent in a child may also
2013] 749
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under federal constitutional privacy interests. Decision-making on future
parenthood can, of course, involve pregnancy establishment and
pregnancy continuation as well as pregnancy termination. Precedents are
scarce. The U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed, for example, to what
extent decisions to pursue pregnancy resulting from AHR (with or
without a surrogate) are protected from undue governmental interference
by federal constitutional privacy interests, and whether any protections
extend beyond birth mothers. 29
AHR statutes now broadly recognize that birth mothers can, in fact,
consent in advance of pregnancy establishment to share, or to waive,
superior parental rights upon birth. Parental decision-making on future
parenthood can also occur postbirth and can involve either sharing, as
with adoption by stepparents, or waiving, as with adoption by strangers
or utilization of safe haven laws. Some Supreme Court cases, like Lehr,
have established certain guidelines on sharing and waiving parental
rights via formal postbirth adoptions-that is, adoptions involving
governmental procedures employed in trial courts. None have addressed
the guidelines for safe haven laws. As well, no major U.S. Supreme
Court case has addressed shared or waived parental rights in other
settings, like informal adoption. There are states, as will be shown, that
recognize, for example, "de facto" parents (as well as "equitable" or
other classes of parents) that necessarily result in shared or waived
superior parental rights.
Whatever the standards on superior parental rights,30 there are federal
constitutional uncertainties regarding how such standards must be
demonstrated. In Santosky v. Kramer,3 1 the Supreme Court ruled that
clear and convincing evidence was needed to support the government's
pursuit of an involuntary parental rights termination based on a finding
that a child is "permanently neglected." 32 It is unclear whether the same
evidentiary standard applies when the government pursues parentage
establishment over objection by an alleged parent, as when
be limited by the state not only because of its own interests, but also because of the
interests of another parent (or family member) in the child. Id.
29. But see T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79 So. 3d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (finding Lehr
interests can arise in woman whose donated egg led to childbirth for her former lesbian
partner).
30. See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 26, at 1080 n.28 ("Although in some cases the Court
has conceived of family status in categorical terms ... in which the line of constitutional
protection for family kinship was drawn at individuals related by 'blood, adoption, or
marriage'-in other cases, the Court has meandered toward a somewhat more functional
understanding of family.").
31. 455 U.S. 745, 796 (1982).
32. Id. at 747.
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reimbursement for child support is sought against a biological father
whose child received welfare, or when the government recognizes shared
or waived parenthood for one who objects, as with an alleged de facto
parent pursued for similar reimbursement. It is also unclear whether
similar standards of proof apply in private settings, as when there may be
waived or shared parentage via prebirth AHR pacts, or when there may
be valid postbirth de facto parent pacts between established parents and
their intimate partners or others.
Loss or diminution of the Troxel superior parental rights, or of the
Lehr paternity opportunity interests, need not be comparably guided,
whether under federal constitutional principles, or under non-
constitutional federal principles, or under constitutional or non-
constitutional state principles within federal constitutional boundaries.
Fundamental federal Due Process interests are more significantly
protected from governmental encroachments than non-fundamental
federal due process interests, and certain fundamental interests, as with
First Amendment speech, are more protected than others.
Non-constitutional principles illustrate how seemingly comparable
federal constitutional rights may be differently lost or diminished, as
with the federal court rules on waiving civil and criminal jury trial
rights.33 As well, seemingly comparable rights, like the right to counsel,
may be differently waived depending on whether they originate, for
example, in constitutional or statutory provisions. 34 Different parental
rights, in both constitutional and non-constitutional settings, may also be
lost or diminished under different procedural standards.
Beyond federal constitutional Due Process limits on state parentage
laws, there may be federal Equal Protection limits. One lower court
found to be discriminatory a statute only allowing a husband of an
intended AHR mother to consent to parentage; thus, one former same sex
female partner's consent to parentage via AHR by the other partner was
35recognized.
33. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 38 (stating the time for demanding civil jury trial), with
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b) (stating that a judge must find that a criminal defendant
"understands .. . the right to a jury trial" and must determine that a "plea is voluntary").
34. See, e.g., In re Welfare of G.L.H., 614 N.W.2d 718, 719 (Minn. 2000) (holding
that state statutory right to counsel in parental rights termination proceedings is
differently waived than federal constitutional right to counsel in felony cases).
35. Shineovich & Kemp, 214 P.3d 29 (Or. Ct. App. 2009). Other courts have stricken
such distinctions on public policy and statutory language grounds. See, e.g., Chatteriee v.
King, 280 P.3d 283, 284 (N.M. 2012) (reviewing cases).
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B. Other Boundaries
Of course, the lack of federal constitutional interests, as with
parentage opportunities for certain unwed biological fathers of children
born of sex to married women under Michael H., does not mean there are
no other protected interests. Non-constitutional federal laws (like the
Indian Child Welfare Act 36) as well as state constitutional, statutory, and
common law dictates can extend greater parentage interests than are
constitutionally required under U.S. Supreme Court precedents.
Exemplary of additional state constitutional parentage interests are
the Iowa Due Process rights of certain putative fathers to challenge the
presumptive paternities of husbands. In Callender v. Skiles,37 a majority
of the Iowa Supreme Court looked to the Michael H. dissent as well as to
its own precedents. Similarly, while the Troxel court did not resolve
whether projected harm to a child was needed to sustain grandparent
visitation orders over parental objections, the Georgia Supreme Court
found such a need "implicit in Georgia cases, statutory and constitutional
law."38
IV. OVERVIEW OF EVOLVING STATE PARENTAGE LAWS
Changes in technology and human conduct have prompted many
recent changes in written state parentage laws. In the absence of new
written laws, common law rulings have sometimes filled in the gaps.
Some state high courts have established broad new guidelines, while
others defer to legislators by either abstaining or treading very
cautiously. Following are overviews of recent state statutory and
common law developments in response to changes in reproductive
technologies and human conduct.
36. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1912 (West 2013), construed in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133
S. Ct. 2552, 2554 (2013) (discussing import of Indian blood in state adoption
proceedings).
37. 591 N.W.2d 182 (Iowa 1999). The putative father in this case later prevailed in
disestablishing the husband as father, establishing his own paternity, and securing
visitation. Callender v. Skiles, 623 N.W.2d 852 (Iowa 2001).
38. Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 773 (Ga. 1995) (following the reasoning




1. Children Born of Sex
State legislators have responded with many new laws on children
born of sex. While DNA testing is not yet generally required before a
man can be deemed a father under law at birth, DNA testing has
increasingly been allowed to override the traditional statutory paternity
presumptions favoring husbands of women who conceive, carry, and/or
bear children during marriage. DNA testing also is increasingly available
to unwed fathers who seek to establish their own paternity as well as to
unwed mothers, state welfare agencies, and children who seek to
establish paternity in order, inter alia, to secure child support.
But DNA testing cannot be used in all legal paternity matters
involving children born of sex. Recall the Michael H. ruling. As well,
when men and unwed mothers sign voluntary acknowledgements of
paternity (VAPs) for children born of sex, both signers are often
foreclosed under law from later rescinding the acknowledgements via
DNA tests showing that there are no male biological ties. 39 Per federal
statute, after sixty days, fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact must be
shown before negative DNA test results can even be presented.40
Unfortunately, the guidelines for fraud and the like vary significantly
between the states,4 1 creating uncertainties.
Parentage via birth by sex is now primarily governed in Illinois by
the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984.42 That Act recognizes that a birth
mother has a parent and child relationship by "having given birth."43
Another parent can establish such a relationship "by proof of adoption.""
A man who does not adopt is presumed under the Act "to be the natural
father of a child" if "the child is born or conceived" during his marriage
to the natural mother; if he and the child's natural mother married after
the child's birth and he is listed as the father on the child's birth
39. Similar foreclosures operate when VAPS are signed by married mothers, their
husbands, and other men, wherein the marital paternity presumptions of the husbands are
overridden and the legal parenthood of the (most often allegedly adulterous) other men is
established. See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 666 (West 2007).
40. Id. § 666(a)(5)(D)(iii).
41. Parness & Townsend, supra note 8, at 60-62. There is also uncertainty regarding
who has standing to challenge acknowledgments based on fraud and the like. See, e.g., In
re N.C., 993 N.E.2d 134, 136 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (resulting in a 2-1 split on whether state
can challenge when signors oppose).
42. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/1 et seq. (West 2013).
43. Id. at 45/4(1).
44. Id. at 45/4(3).
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certificate; or if he and the mother signed an acknowledgement of the
man's paternity or parentage.4 5 A male acknowledgement of parentage
seemingly may be undertaken in Illinois only when the male and female
acknowledgers believe the acknowledged man is, or is likely to be, the
biological father.46 Genetic tests to confirm male ties before or after
acknowledgments are not required, however.47 Acknowledgement
processes thus appear to be statutorily unavailable to same sex couples
and to opposite sex couples when the man is not genetically tied to the
child, though these and similar limits are sometimes skirted with
success. 48
The Proposed Illinois Parentage Act of 2013 (PIPA)49 would alter
Illinois law on the presumed paternity of a husband whose past, present,
or future wife bears a child. PIPA establishes a man as a presumed parent
of a child born to his wife only when the child is "born" during the man's
marriage, civil union, or "substantially similar legal relationship" with
the mother5o as well as of a child born to his ex-wife within 300 days
after a similar state-recognized relationship has been terminated.5 Unlike
the 1984 Act, PIPA would not establish a man as a presumed parent if a
45. Id. at 45/5(a)(1)-(4). The marriage-related presumptions are overcome differently
(i.e., rebuttals) than the acknowledgment presumptions (i.e., rescissions). Id. at 45/5(b).
46. See, e.g., 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 535/12(5). Further, the instruction for
completing the Illinois Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity form says the "purpose"
is to establish legally "the biological father and child relationship (when the biological
father is not married to the child's mother)." Department of Public Aid Form 3416BC4
(R-8-2000).
47. On the variations in state processes on affirmations regarding genetic ties between
male signers and children, see Parness & Townsend, supra note 8, at 72-73.
48. See, e.g., DeBoer v. DeBoer, 822 N.W.2d 730, 735 (S.D. 2012); Leslie Joan
Harris, Voluntary Acknowledgments of Parentage for Same-Sex Couples, 20 AM. U. J.
GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 467, 480-82 (2012) (reviewing cases and urging that
acknowledgments should be avallable to same sex couples when one acknowledger has
no genetic ties). On the need for expanding acknowledgment processes, see Nancy E.
Dowd, Parentage at Birth: Birthfathers and Social Fatherhood, 14 WM. & MARY BILL
RTs. J. 909, 916-38 (2006) (urging that multiple fathers be allowed); Laura Nicole
Althouse, Three's Company? How American Law Can Recognize a Third Social Parent
in Same-Sex Headed Families, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 171, 201-08 (2008) (urging
that Dowd's principles be applied to same sex couples who co-parent).
49. H.B. 1243, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013) (PIPA). Both PIPA and the
Proposed Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act of 2013 (PIMDMA), H.B.
1452, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013), were initially proposed by the Illinois
Family Law Study Committee, established by the Illinois General Assembly. For a
thorough review of a similar study committee's work in Oregon, see Leslie Joan Harris, A
New Paternity Lw for the Twenty-First Century: Of Biology, Social Function,
Children's Interests, and Betrayal, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 297 (2007).
50. H.B. 1234 § 204(a)(1).
51. Id. § 204(a)(2).
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child is conceived, but not born, during a man's state-recognized
relationship with the birth mother, although here a paternity case could
establish the former husband's parentage. PIPA also newly extends a
comparable parentage presumption to a woman whose partner in a "legal
relationship" bears a child.52
As well, PIPA newly recognizes presumed parentage of a child for
either a man or a woman who "for the first 2 years after the birth of the
child ... resided in a household with the child, openly held out the child"
as his or her own "during that time," when the "child had only one parent
under law . . . and that parent consented" to the "holding out."53 PIPA
does remove voluntary parentage (or paternity) acknowledgements from
presumptive parenthood, declaring they establish parentage, which may
be rescinded under certain circumstances.54
The Proposed Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act of
2013 (PIMDMA)55 would also, and more radically, alter Illinois
parentage laws on children born of sex. It replaces court-ordered child
custody and visitation with judicial allocations of "parental
responsibilities," which include "significant decision-making
responsibilities with respect to the child" and judicial allocations of
"parenting time," which do not envision significant decision-making. 5 6
Only legal parents, meaning biological or adoptive parents, ordinarily
would be eligible for allocations of "parental responsibilities.""
Allocations of "parenting time" could be made to "equitable parents,"
defined to include those who provided childcare, like the child's present
or former stepparent;5 a man or woman who "lived with the child for at
least two years" while having "a reasonable, good-faith belief' that "he
or she was the child's biological parent" based on "marriage to the
child's legal parent or on the actions or representations of the legal
parent";59 and, a person who "lived with the child since the child's birth
or for at least 2 years, and held himself out as the child's parent . .. under
52. Id. § 204(b).
53. Id. § 204(a)(5) (man); § 204(b)(5) (woman).
54. Id. § 204(a).
55. H.B. 1452 § 47.
56. Id. § 600. See also COLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-124(1.5) (West 2013) (stating
that a court determines "the allocation of parental responsibilities, including parenting
time and decision-making responsibilities").
57. H.B. 1452 §§ 600; 602.5(b).
58. Id. § 600.
59. Id.
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an agreement with the child's legal parent (or, if there are 2 legal parents,
both parents) to rear the child together."a
For children born of sex outside of Illinois, there are state laws
comparable to both the existing and proposed Illinois provisions.61
Marital parentage presumptions and establishments often operate today
for husbands whose wives give birth to children born of sex (and, at
times, one would imagine, to children born of AHR where there is no
specific AHR law,62 or where the use of AHR is known,63 unknown, or
of no concern to the husbands.)" As in Illinois, relevant marriages often
60. Id. Compare AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DissoLUTION §
2.09 (2002) [hereinafter ALI Principles], with id. § 2.03(1)(b), (c) (employing the phrase
"custodial responsibility" in lieu of "custody" and "visitation," distinguishing childcare
possibilities for non-biological equitable parents (comparable to PIMDMA "legal"
parents) and non-biological de facto parents (comparable to PIMDMA "equitable"
parents)).
61. At times, choices between differing state parentage laws must be made to resolve
cases involving human reproductive acts in different states, as when sex occurs in one
state and birth in another state. Sometimes specific statutes guide, as in AHR cases with
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-776(a) (West 2013) (stating that a child conceived via
certain forms of AHR performed in Connecticut and born elsewhere "shall have his status
determined by the law of the other jurisdiction unless the mother . . . is domiciled in
Connecticut at the time of the birth"); id. § 45a-776(b) (stating that a child conceived via
certain forms of AHR in another jurisdiction, who is born in Connecticut to a husband
and wife who were not Connecticut domiciliaries at the time of conception, but were at
the time of birth, has the same status as a child conceived via AHR and born in
Connecticut).
Parentage presumptions are reviewed in Gartner v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Health,
830 N.W.2d 335, 345 n.1 (Iowa 2013) (noting that characteristics often include
"traditional gender terms," like husband and wife, and speak to presumed parents' shared
genetic connections, though some "apply or could apply in a gender-neutral manner or to
same-sex spouses").
62. Specific AHR laws include FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West 2013) (setting forth
irrebuttable presumption of parentage in husband and wife when both consent "in
writing" to AHR and wife bears child); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2303 (West 2013)
(mentioning AHR consents by husband, wife, and "the person who is to perform the
technique," which may be filed in the state district court); ALA. CODE § 26-17-704(b)
(West 2013) (stating that failure by husband to consent to AHR undertaken by wife does
not preclude husband as father "if the wife and husband openly held out the child as their
own"); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-5405(3) (West 2013) (stating that mother's husband,
when child born of AHR, has same relationship, rights, and obligations regarding child as
he would have if the child was naturally conceived by mother, but only "if the husband
consented to the performance of artificial insemination").
63. See, e.g., Engelking v. Engelking, 982 N.E.2d 326, 328 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)
(holding that husband consented to wife's AHR with another man's semen so husband,
per statute, IND. CODE ANN. § 31-9-13(a)(2) (West 2013), is the father of child born
during marriage).
64. Less frequently, there are rebuttable presumptions of maternity in women who are
not birth mothers. See, e.g., In re D.S., 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 918, 924 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012)
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may predate conception, occur during pregnancy, or be celebrated after
birth. There are some noteworthy variations. As noted, in Illinois today
the presumption arises when a child "is born or conceived" during a valid
marriage, while PIPA would prompt a presumption if a child is "born"
during a marriage. 6 5 PIPA would also extend a presumption to women
and men in state-recognized relationships "substantially similar" to
marriage.66 Elsewhere some state statutes speak to children "born during
the marriage" 6 7 while others recognize children born or conceived during
marriage.68
Presumptions of parentage arise in statutes outside of Illinois today
without marriage. Some are founded on presumed natural ties and some
are founded on parental-like acts of nonparents, with parental consents,
including residing with children who are held out as their own. In
Nevada, a "man is presumed to be a natural father of a child if [h]e and
the child's mother were cohabiting for at least 6 months before the period
(holding that presumption does not cover stepmother who helped raise children born of
sex, as here natural mother had not lost parental rights); In re T.J.S., 54 A.3d 263, 264
(N.J. 2012) (equally divided court finding no maternity presumption in AHR with
surrogate setting); Della Corte v. Ramirez, 961 N.E.2d 601, 602 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012)
(finding former same sex female spouse was presumed second parent to child born of
AHR to other female spouse).
65. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 45/5(a)(1)-(4) (West 2013); H.B. 1243 § 204(a)(1).
66. H.B. 1243 § 204(a)(1).
67. See, e.g., NEV. STAT. ANN. § 126.051(1)(a) (West 2013); MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 64 § 6(a)(1) (West 2013); LA. STAT. CIVIL CODE ANN. Art. 185 (2005); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-1114(a)(1) (West 2013); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-14-7-1(B); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
6, § 8-204(a)(1) (West 2013).
68. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-814(A)(1) (West 2013) (recognizing man
and mother "married at any time in the ten months immediately preceding the birth);
Engelking, 982 N.E.2d at 327 (addressing child born to wife via do-it-yourself AHR with
sperm from wife's friend's husband and with wife's husband's consent). Compare MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1027(c)(1) (West 2013) ("man to whom" child's "mother was
married at the time of conception"), with IND. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2-13(a)(2) (West 2013)
(child of marriage includes child "born or adopted" during the marriage).
Beside differences in the timing of marriages relevant to parentage, there can be
differences in the circumstances constituting marriage. Compare, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §
741.211 (West 2013) (no common law marriage after 1968), GA. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-1.1
(2013) (no common law marriage after 1997), IND. STAT. ANN. § 31-11-8-5 (2013) (no
common law marriage after 1958), and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.12 (West 2013)
(new common law marriages prohibited after October 10, 1991), with IOWA CODE ANN. §
252A.3(6-9) (West 2013) (common law marriages lead to legitimacy for children born
and to spousal status), N.H. STAT. ANN. § 457:39 (West 2013) ("Persons cohabiting and
acknowledging each other as husband and wife . . . for the period of 3 years . . . shall
thereafter be deemed to have been legally married."), UTAH CODE STAT. ANN. § 30-1-4.5
(West 2013) (elements of common law marriage), and COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-
109.5 (West 2013) (requisites for common law marriages contracted on or after Sept. 1,
2006).
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of conception and continued to cohabit through the period of
conception .,,69 Neither preconception nor postconception but prebirth
acts are needed in Montana where a presumption of natural fatherhood
arises for a "person" who, "while the child is under the age of majority. .
receives the child into the person's home and openly represents the
child to be the person's natural child."70 In Alabama, there is a
comparable presumption except that the "man" is not presumed to have
natural ties and must have established "a significant parental relationship
with the child by providing emotional and financial support for the
child."7 In Texas, "[a] man is presumed to be the father" (though not the
natural father) of a child "if . .. during the first two years of the child's
life, he continuously resided in the household in which the child resided
and he represented to others that the child was his own."72 By contrast, in
Washington "a person is presumed to be the parent of a child if, for the
first two years of the child's life, the person resided in the same
household with the child and openly held out the child as his or her
own."73 At times, presumptions of natural ties and parentage are
prompted by postbirth parent-like acts of a woman who is not the birth
mother.74
Outside of Illinois there are also (as in Illinois) non-marital parentage
presumptions founded on voluntary paternity (or sometimes parentage)
acknowledgments. Some states do not employ a presumptive parent
approach to acknowledgers, opting instead for parentage establishment
76al
upon acknowledgments, though all acknowledgments are always
susceptible to at least some avenues of rescission.
69. NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 126.051(1)(b) (West 2013).
70. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-105(d)(1) (West 2013). See also COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 19-4-105(1)(d) (West 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-43(a)(4) (West 2013); CAL.
FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 2013) (making no reference to under majority age, but
"child" is received into home).
71. ALA. CODE § 26-17-204(a)(5) (West 2013).
72. TEx. CODE ANN. § 160.204(a)(5) (West 2013). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §
204(a)(5) (West 2013) (making a presumption of fatherhood if the man "resided in the
same household"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-1 IA-204(a)(5) (West 2013); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. §14-20-10(1)(e) (West 2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7700-204; WYo. STAT.
ANN. § 14-2-504(a)(v) (West 2013).
73. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.116(2) (West 2013).
74. See, e.g., In re Domestic P'ship of C.P. & D.F., No. E052672, 2013 WL 2099156
(Cal. Ct. App. May 16, 2013) (reviewing California cases).
75. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-105(e) (West 2013) (stating that a man is
presumed to be the natural father if he acknowledges his paternity); D.C. CODE § 16-
909(a)(4) (2013) (stating that a presumption exists that a man is a father if he
acknowledges paternity in writing).
76. A move from presumption to establishment is proposed in PIPA. H.B. 1243, §
204(a). See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-120(a) (West 2013) (stating that a man is the
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2. Children Born of AHR
Technology and human conduct changes have also spurred many
new parentage laws on births via AHR. New statutory schemes can
recognize the parental desires of both unwed and wed opposite sex
couples; of unwed and wed same sex couples; and of individual would-
be parents, who can be either female (as when artificial insemination is
employed) or male (as when a surrogate is employed).
Parentage in Illinois when birth is by AHR without a surrogate is
now significantly governed by the Illinois Parentage Act.7 9 That Act,
effective in 1984, guides births to wives when there is required both
licensed physician supervision and written consents of husbands that are
acknowledged by their wives in settings where the husbands are not the
semen donors.80 When the husbands are the semen donors, the husbands
are like husbands of women who bear children born of sex as long as the
husband consented. When AHR processes are employed solely by
wives, with no consents by husbands (as with turkey basters), the marital
parentage presumptions seemingly can operate as the presumptions arise
for all children, not just for children born of sex.
Parentage via birth by AHR with a surrogate is now governed in
Illinois by the Gestational Surrogacy Act, effective in 2005.82 That Act
guides reproductive contracts between a gestational surrogate and an
intended parent or two intended parents. Such contracts must involve at
least one intended parent who contributes "one of the gametes resulting
in a pre-embryo that the gestational surrogate will attempt to carry to
father "for all intents and purposes if he and the mother execute an acknowledgment of
paternity").
77. Under federal statute, states participating in certain federal welfare programs must
allow acknowledgers to rescind within sixty days of signing (in part because positive
DNA tests are not required for males acknowledging parentage, but also because the sixty
day period allows for post-signing testing and perhaps rescission thereafter); after sixty
days, states may only allow rescission upon demonstration of fraud, duress, or material
mistake of fact. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)(5)(D) (West 2013). See, e.g., In re of Oscar X.F.,
967 N.Y.S.2d 117 (N.Y. App. 2d 2013) (finding that even with such a demonstration, no
rescission (due to estoppel) when challenge to paternity is not in the child's best interest).
78. This paper does not explore emerging AHR techniques involving, e.g., somatic
cell nuclear transfer and stem cell technologies. See, e.g., Yehezkel Margalit, Orrie Adam
Levy & John D. Loike, The New Frontier of Advanced Reproductive Technology:
Reevaluating Modern Legal Parenthood, 37 HARV. J. L. & GENDER (forthcoming 2014),
available at http://papers.SSRN.com/2013/papers.cfm?abstractid=2290702.
79. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 40/1 (West 2013).
80. Id. § 40/3(a).
81. Id. § 40/2.
82. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 47/1 (West 2013).
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term" 83 as well as a "medical need for the gestational surrogacy" by at
least one intended parent.8 There is no statutory recognition in Illinois,
as there is not elsewhere, of a presex or postsex surrogacy contract with a
woman whose pregnancy resulted from sex.85
PIPA would alter the current Illinois Parentage Act but not the
current Gestational Surrogacy Act. Under PIPA, opposite sex and same
sex couples, wed or unwed, could employ assisted reproduction in order
for a nonbirth mother to secure parentage.86 Under PIPA, licensed
physicians need not be employed, and written consents, while required,
include postbirth ratifications of earlier oral agreements.87
For children born of AHR outside of Illinois, there are state laws88
comparable to both the existing and proposed Illinois provisions. On
births via AHR with a surrogate, not all states recognize the validity of
surrogacy contracts. In Michigan, for example, a "surrogate contract is
void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy." 89 By contrast,
Arkansas statutes, not unlike PIMDMA, declare that surrogate mothers
can be used by unwed opposite sex couples, unwed sperm donors, and
women who employ "an anonymous donor's sperm." 90 In New Mexico,
the enforceability of a "gestational agreement between a woman and the
83. Id. § 47/20(b)(1).
84. Id. § 47/20(b)(2).
85. But see In re S.N.V., 284 P.3d 147, 148 (Colo. App. 2011) (addressing alleged
unwritten surrogacy pact between married opposite sex couple and birth mother when
child born of sex).
86. H.B. 1243, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 703 (Ill. 2013) ("[P]erson who
provides gametes for, or consents to, assisted reproduction . . . with the intent to be the
parent . . . is a parent.").
87. Id. § 704.
88. At times, choices between differing state parentage laws must be made to resolve
cases involving conception and birth acts occurring in two or more jurisdictions.
Sometimes specific statutes guide on children born of AHR. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 45a-776(a)-(b) (West 2013).
89. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.855 (West 2013). On what prompts such hostility
(and its lack of empirical support), see Lina Peng, Surrogate Mothers: An Exploration of
the Empirical and the Normative, 21 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. Pot'Y & L. 555 (2013). On
the benefits of permitting commercial surrogacy (albeit regulated), see Pamela Laufer-
Ukeles, Mothering for Money: Regulating Commercial Surrogacy, 88 IND. L.J. 1223
(2013) (stating that American states should encourage domestic surrogacy systems).
90. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (b)-(c) (West 2013).
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intended parents" is left to the courts. 9' And in Utah, statutes guide
judicial discretion in validating gestational agreements prebirth.92
For births via AHR without a surrogate in Massachusetts, unlike in
Illinois today, 3 there is parentage in the husband with no requirement for
a licensed physician or for written consent when semen is provided by a
third party.94 In Alaska and Florida, written consent of the husband is
needed even when his sperm is employed.95 In Kansas, there is required
consent by the wife, husband, and doctor.96 In Ohio, there is a separate
statutory scheme dealing with "non-spousal artificial insemination for the
purpose of impregnating a woman so that she can bear a child she
intends to raise as her child" through using "the semen of a man who is
not her husband."97 This scheme includes unwed women.9 8 In the District
of Columbia, parentage is available for a "person who intends to be a
parent of a child born" to a woman by artificial insemination." And in
Arkansas, a child born to a married woman via AHR is deemed "the
legitimate natural child of . . . the woman's husband if the husband
consents in writing," whereas the child born to a married woman via
AHR where there is no consent by the husband is still "presumed to be
91. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-l lA-801 (West 2013) (neither "authoriz[ing] or
prohibit[ing]" such an agreement). But see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-121 (West 2013)
(addressing parenthood of child born to gestational carrier in absence of a court order).
92. UTAH CODE STAT. ANN. §§ 78B-15-802, 803. State statutes and their policies are
well reviewed in Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 89 (averring that statutes must balance
concerns of intimacy and benefits of commerciality).
93. The Missouri law parallels the Illinois law. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.824 (West
2013).
94. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 4B (West 2013).
95. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.20.045 (West 2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11(1)
(West 2013).
96. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-2301, -2303 (West 2013).
97. OHIO CODE REV. ANN. § 3111.89 (West 2013) (physician supervision and written
consent). An early trial court ruling found that a donor in a non-spousal AHR setting
without a surrogate could not always be denied legal parenthood under the "due process
safeguards" of Lehr. C.O. v. W.S., 639 N.E.2d 523, 525 (C.P. Cuyahoga Cnty., Ohio
1994).
98. OHIo REV. ANN. CODE § 3111.93(A)(1)(d) (West 2013) (requiring that a recipient
of artificial insemination must consent, with her husband's consent required if she is
married). See also TEX. CODE ANN. § 160.7031 (West 2013) (stating that unmarried man
and unmarried woman can parent a child conceived via AHR).
99. D.C. CODE § 16-909(e)(1)(A) (West 2013) (stating that consent by birth mother
and person must be "in writing"; without a writing, the person intending parentage is a
parent when the person and birth mother "resided together in the same household with the
child and openly held the child out as their own").
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the child of . .. the woman's husband except in the case of a surrogate
mother."10
For births via AHR without a surrogate that fall outside the explicit
statutory parameters, statutory principles may still apply. For example, in
a "do-it-yourself' AHR pregnancy involving a lesbian birth mother and
her partner, statutes were applied to a semen donor who alleged himself
to be the father under law and who was the brother of the partner who
separated from the birth mother, who herself desired continuing childcare
opportunities. os
B. Common Law Developments
In the absence of, or together with, state statutory responses to the
new technologies and new forms of human conduct, parentage law
reforms can occur via common law precedents. Some courts have
responded, utilizing concepts like de facto parentage;IO2 parentage by
estoppel;103 and in loco parentis." Other courts significantly defer to
legislators, even while recognizing the new technologies and the growing
numbers of unconventional families.'05 As one dissent observed, "Only
legislation defining parentage in the context of assisted reproduction is
likely to restore predictability and prevent further lapses into the disorder
of ad hoc adjudication."'0
100. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(a)-(b) (West 2013). A child born via AHR to an
unmarried woman is only "the child of the woman giving birth, except in the case of a
surrogate mother." Id. § 9-10-201 (c)(1 ).
101. A.A.B. v. B.O.C., 112 So. 3d 761, 763 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (relying, in part,
on In Re H.C.S., 219 S.W.3d 33 (Tex. 2006), a "factually similar" case, and contrasting
other cases in which noncompliance with express statutory terms led to different results).
102. In re Parentage of L.B., 89 P.3d 271, 282 (Wash. Ct.. 2004) (holding that former
female domestic partner of birth mother has a common law de facto or psychological
parent claim; requisite elements often include parental consent to nonparents developing
parent-like relationships; same residence; lack of financial consideration by nonparents;
and a "bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature").
103. See, e.g., Richard M. v. Alejandra H., 969 N.Y.S.D. 806, 811 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
2013) (noting three common situations for "equitable estoppel," which can be used
affirmatively or defensively).
104. See, e.g., Daniel v. Spivey, 386 S.W.3d 424, 428 (Ark. 2012) (finding that some
divorcing stepfathers qualify, but others do not).
105. See, e.g., In re T.J.S., 16 A.3d 386, 398 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (finding
that the legislature, not the court, should decide whether parentage vests at birth in a wife
whose husband's sperm led to the birth of another child with a surrogate per AHR);
Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d 1, 14-15 (Del. 2009) (finding that de facto parentage must be
undertaken by General Assembly).
106. K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 690 (Cal. 2005) (Werdegar, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with the majority finding that both lesbian partners were parents of twins
born to one partner via AHR with ova of other partner).
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Judicial responses within a single state are often not uniform, so
there can be common law initiatives in some, but not all, parentage
settings. For example, common law contractual parentage has been
recognized in Illinois for births arising from assisted reproduction, but
not for births arising from sex.'o7
Evolving common law developments can be invited by legislators, as
with flexible statutory standards accompanied by (either express or
implied) recognitions of broad judicial discretion. Yet legislators can
discourage judicial initiatives, as with detailed and determinate standards
said to be exclusive.
Common law precedents have determined parentage issues for
nonbiological and nonadoptive parents in settings involving both sex 08
and AHR with' or without a surrogate.110 Rulings can supplement or
extend, as well as interpret, existing statutes within each context.
Rulings sometimes operate where there are no written laws.
V. KEY QUESTIONS FACING AMERICAN STATE LAWMAKERS
With changes in technology and conduct, American state lawmakers
must today decide how far, if at all, to extend parentage arising prebirth,
at birth, soon after birth, or long after birth to those who are neither
(actual or alleged) biological parents nor adoptive parents. Statutes and
precedents already recognize some such interests. In considering further
extensions, state lawmakers necessarily face several important public
policy questions that will often involve state public policy choices, as
U.S. Supreme Court precedents are, to date, deferential to state authority.
A. Redefine Biological and Adoptive Ties?
Initially, state lawmakers must decide whether to stray far from
recognizing only the traditionally narrow realms of biological and
107. Jeffrey Parness, Federal Constitutional Childcare Interests and Superior Rights in
Illinois, 33 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 305, 339-41 (2013) (reviewing In re T.P.S. 978 N.E.2d
1070 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)).
108. See, e.g., Randy A.J. v. Norma I.J., 677 N.W.2d 630, 641-42 (Wis. 2004) (finding
the equitable parent doctrine not applicable, but determining that the equitable estoppel
doctrine operates in childcare disputes when children would be harmed otherwise).
109. See, e.g., In re F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d 634, 658 (Wis. 2013) (upholding much of
surrogacy contract but invalidating a provision requiring the surrogate mother to
terminate her parental rights).
110. See, e.g., Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542, 544 (Kan. 2013) (upholding co-
parenting agreement between lesbian couple); In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1051 (Kan.
2007) (reviewing cases outside statute and refusing to extend paternity to sperm donor
acting outside statutory guidelines).
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adoptive parents. Variances could include altered definitions of
biological and adoptive ties leading to expanded parentage opportunities,
as with certain presumption laws where there need be no actual
biological ties.
Male parentage of and for children born of sex that is founded on
presumed sperm ties need not involve actual sex between birth mothers
and presumed fathers. A husband is presumed to be the biological father
whether or not a sexual encounter with his wife prompted the pregnancy
and birth. As well, if the wife/mother in a case like Michael H. conceived
via AHR without her husband's semen, the same presumption of
biological ties, and thus of parentage, would still likely arise for the
husband in the absence of a special AHR statute. Thus, as actual
biological ties are not always required for opposite sex marital parentage
presumptions, biological ties could conceivably be presumed for lesbian
partners married to childbearing mothers where donated eggs are always
presumed at least initially. With AHR, biological ties both with the birth
mother and her female partner are at least possible. Yet, even when
biological ties are impossible, as with children born of sex into a lesbian
couple, state lawmakers could still employ an approach involving
parentage presumptions-as in PIPA, where children born of sex to
women in same sex relationships have the birth mothers' partners as
presumed parents."' Some American states also now presume parentage
in those who hold out children as their own even though no "natural" ties
are presumed.112 Yet confusion might arise as presumptive parentage has
traditionally embodied presumed parents who possibly, and often
probably, are biologically tied to the children. So, this approach should
be disfavored. In Illinois, PIPA would remove the presumed "natural"
ties of a father and recognize "parentage" for either a man or woman,13 a
preferred approach.
Adoptive ties could also be redefined to accommodate changes in
human conduct. Informal or de facto adoptions (i.e., without adoption
petitions approved in governmental proceedings) could arise for those in
parental-like relationships with certain children for certain periods of
time even though there are no presumed natural ties. Such adoptions
might be limited to children being reared in nuclear families that include
at least one parent with biological or formal adoption ties. New forms of
informal adoptions could also be recognized outside nuclear families,
I 11. H.B. 1243, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 204(b) (Ill. 2013).
112. Compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-105(1)(d) (West 2013) (presumed natural
ties), with TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.204(a)(5) (West 2013) (no presumed natural ties).
113. Compare 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 45/5 (West 2013) (man a presumed
"natural father"), with H.B. 1243 § 204(a) (man), (b) (woman).
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though they might be limited to certain folks, like grandparents or
stepparents. Here, confusion could be diminished if differing categories
(or tiers or gradations) of adoption were recognized.
There are legitimate concerns with expanding parentage via altered
definitions of biological and adoptive ties, however. Most importantly,
there would be confusion over terms and concerns about pretext.
B. Three or More Parents?
Assuming parentage law reforms extending beyond biological or
adoptive ties, however defined, one key question involves the
circumstances under which three or more people might be deemed
parents (of some form) imbued with standing to seek at least some form
of court-ordered childcare, as with "parenting time." The two pending
Illinois proposals, for now, offer conflicting answers. Presumed
parentage before PIPA meant a rebuttable presumption about male
parentage, wherein only one man seemingly could be a father at any
particular time.1 14 Thus, a husband's presumed parentage arising from
marriage could be rebutted with proof of no genetic ties, with similar
proof also available at times to rescind a paternity acknowledgment
involving alleged genetic ties prompting a comparable presumed
parentage in an unwed father."' 5 Few cases in Illinois, and across the
United States, have recognized a second father for a child who already
has a father and mother."16 PIPA now calls for a judicial choice of one or
another presumed parent who will rear a child born of sex with the birth
mother, with the choice guided by logic and public policy, especially the
child's best interests.'' 7 Under PIPA, as in California'' 8 and elsewhere, 1 9
114. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 45/5(a)-(b).
15. Id. § 45(a)(3)-(4), (b).
116. But see, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 11 (2008) (reviewing commentaries and cases on "multi-parentage").
117. H.B. 1243 § 204(c). Thus, under PIPA, when there are two competing presumed
parents, one can be male and one can be female-as has been recognized elsewhere. See,
e.g., In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (typically the male has
biological ties-and perhaps a parental-like relationship-and the female has a parental-
like relationship).
118. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(b) (West 2013) (resolving competing presumptions of
natural fatherhood "on the facts . . . founded on the weightier considerations of policy and
logic"), construed in In re Mia C., No. C069411, 2013 WL 2601865 (Cal. Ct. App. June
12, 2013) (holding that separated husband prevails over mother's live-in girlfriend).
There is no choice to be made when one of the presumptions has been recognized in a
court judgment. J.B. v. Superior Court, No. C071961, 2013 WL 6092880 (Cal. Ct. App.
Nov. 20, 2013).
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there can initially be a birth mother and two presumed parents-though
only one presumed parent usually can continue.120
But PIMDMA allows three or more parents, if perhaps only two
legal parents of children born of sex. It has, for example, no provision on
a mandated judicial choice between two competing equitable parents.121
In other states and under PIPA when there is a mother and two presumed
fathers, statutes guide courts on choosing which man's presumed status
will be ended. In California and under PIPA, choices between two
competing parentage presumptions, as between a husband and man who
held himself out as a father, are done by assessing "the weightier
considerations of policy and logic."' 2 2 By contrast, in Louisiana, the high
court123 has recognized, via its common lawmaking authority, that three
different parents of a child born of sex-two men (a husband and the
natural father) and a woman (the birth mother)-may child-rear per court
order. A Delaware statute on de facto parent status allows this as well.124
If at all, under what circumstances should three or more people
simultaneously have legally recognized childcare interests as parents? If
The failed General Assembly attempt in 2012 (due to gubernatorial veto) to
recognize the possibility of three parents for one child is reviewed in Elizabeth A.
Pfenson, Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen?: The Potential Concerns of Finding More
Parents and Fewer Legal Strangers in California's Recently-Proposed Multiple Parents
Bill, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2023 (2013) (arguing against more than two parents).
119. See, e.g., People ex rel. C.L.S., 313 P.3d 662 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011) (resolving
two men's competing parentage presumptions under COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-
105(2)(a) (West 2013) according to "weightier considerations of policy and logic").
120. But see In re Parentage of J.W., 990 N.E.2d 698 (Ill. 2013) (deciding whether to
award biological father visitation under best interests tests when former husband, a
presumed father, failed to challenge biological dad's standing to seek a childcare order,
even though both mother and former husband also have childcare orders; seemingly,
agreement or waiver can lead to three parents).
121. H.B. 1452, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 600 (Ill. 2013) (defining equitable
parent to include a person who, though not a biological or adoptive parent, is the child's
current stepparent or the child's former stepparent).
122. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(b); H.B. 1243 § 204(c).
123. See, e.g., Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847 (La. 1989); T.D. v. M.M.M., 730 So. 2d
873 (La. 1999).
124. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c)(1) (2013) (holding that de facto parent "has
had the support and consent of the child's parent or parents who fostered the formation
and establishment of a parent-like relationship between the child and the de facto
parent"). Similar is D.C. CODE §16-831.01(1) (2013) ("[Dle facto parent [has] held
himself or herself out as the child's parent with the agreement of the child's parent, or if
there are 2 parents, both parents."). In September 2012, Governor Jerry Brown vetoed a
multiple parents measure in California (SB 1476), being sympathetic to the measure but
saying more time was needed to study all the implications. Jim Sanders, Jerry Brown





only two may have such interests, may three or more persons be parents
for child support (or other) purposes? Relatedly, when-if ever-should
certain people, like grandparents, former stepparents, or former
boyfriends/girlfriends, be accorded standing as nonparents to seek
childcare (including custodial) orders even though there are one or two
parents who object?l 2 5 Here, the lack of parental status and the existence
of even two parents under law might not always foreclose parental-like
rights (and responsibilities) for nonparents.
C. Nonparents?
Should certain family members, or others, be accorded special
standing allowing them to seek at least "parenting time," if not greater or
lesser forms of childcare, though they are not recognized as (legal or
equitable) parents and though there is a parental objection? If so, should
"parenting time" and the like for nonparents be limited to those in
intimate relationships with legal parents? If special childcare standing is
accorded to certain nonparent, nonintimate family members over parental
objection,126 how should nonparents be distinguished from other (present
or former) family members and others who have also cared for the child?
Consider grandparents who often rear, or help to rear, their
grandchildren under agreements with their grandchildren's parents with
whom they are not involved in intimate relationships.12 7 Should
grandparents (not included as parents in the PIMDMAl 28) and
stepparents (present and former, both included as parents in the
PIMDMA 2 9) be distinguished? Should grandparents, still part of a
125. See, e.g., N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney 2012) (stating that "extraordinary
circumstances" are presumed upon two years of "continuous" voluntary relinquishment
of child, and child's best interests can prompt grandparent custody over parental
objection), applied in Laudadio v. Laudadio, 962 N.Y.S.2d 485 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
126. See, e.g., E.C. v. J.V., 136 Cal. Rptr. 3d 339 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that the
lack of a sexual relationship between a mother and her girlfriend at the time a child is
born and the lack of involvement in mother's impregnation arising from sex are not
relevant to whether the girlfriend held the child out as her own, thereby acquiring
presumed parent status).
127. On the increases in grandparents serving as primary caregivers for their
grandchildren, see Gretchen Livingston & Kim Parker, Since the Start of the Great
Recession, More Children Raised by Grandparents, PEW RES. CENTER (Sept. 9, 2010),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2010/09/09/since-the-start-of-the-great-recession-more-
children-raised-by-grandparents/.
128. H.B. 1452, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 600 (Ill. 2013).
129. Id. (defining "equitable parent" to include a "child's stepparent," who is "a
person, other than a biological or adoptive parent, who is or was married to a legal
parent," defined as "a biological or adoptive parent").
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family that includes parents and their children, be accorded less standing
to seek childcare orders than former stepparents, who are no longer
within nuclear families of the parents and their children? Nonparents, but
not parents, often must show "extraordinary" reasons to obtain childcare
orders.130 PIMDMA now makes this distinction. Should it? And how
about recognizing parent-like statuses for, e.g., the long-term intimate,
but not married or unionized, partners of parents who helped child-rear
within "unitary" families under Michael H.-that is, within "households
of unmarried parents and their children"?'31
As to nonparent childcare standing notwithstanding parental
objection, the Troxel opinions provide some guidance. The Troxel
plurality, per Justice O'Connor, suggested nonparent visitation
opportunities might be permitted even without a showing of a need to
avoid potential harm.132 Justice Stevens suggested that there could be a
nonparent childcare statute with "a plainly legitimate sweep,"' 3 3 while
Justice Scalia deemed that elected legislators could craft "gradations" of
nonparents "who may have some claim against the wishes of parents," 34
and Justice Kennedy hinted that nonparent childcare legislation could
survive as long as the nonparent acted "in a caregiving role over a
significant period of time."135
Of course, any parental objection might be unavailable due to earlier
parental consent to shared childcare. Such consents will later be
reviewed herein. Parents may also lose their right to object, as when
parental rights are ended, even though their family members (like
grandparents) may continue to have standing to pursue a childcare
order.136
130. See, e.g., Brown v. Burch, 519 S.E.2d 403, 410, 412 (Va. Ct. App. 1999)
(awarding joint custody to stepfather and father over mother's objection, as stepfather
showed "clear and convincing evidence of special and unique circumstances" that
justified denying mother custody).
131. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 n.3. (1989).
132. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73, 77 (2000).
133. Id. at 85.
134. Id. at 93.
135. Id. at 98 (differentiating strangers from de facto parents).
136. See, e.g., Dotson v. Rowe, 957 S.W.2d 269 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997) (finding
grandparent standing though parental rights terminated). But see Palmer v. Burnett, 384
S.W.3d 204 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) (finding no grandparent standing regarding visitation





Yet another question involves whether parent (or special nonparent)
status should necessitate the same household residence and, if so, for the
first two years after birth, as in PIPA. Why should an aspiring parent be
denied parentage simply because there were two households, even if only
for a little while, as when the aspiring parent was deployed by the
military or lived apart for job-related reasons? The Delaware statute' 37 on
de facto parentage has no two-year residency requirement. Delaware has,
in fact, no residency requirement whatsoever, as it demands, inter alia,
exercise of "parental responsibility" and service in a "parental role" that
led to a "bonded and dependent relationship . . . that is parental in
nature."l 38 In New Jersey, as well, a man is "presumed to be the
biological father of a child if" he "openly holds out the child as his
natural child" and either "receives the child into his home"' 3 9 or
"provides support for the child." 40
E. Child Support?
A further question is whether the same child support orders should
be available against all nonbiological and nonadoptive parents as they are
against all biological and adoptive parents. Should support be available
from a nonbiological and nonadoptive parent (like a former stepparent)
who, though eligible, chooses not to pursue an allocation of child
visitation or "parenting time" after an intimate relationship with the
child's biological or adoptive parent ends? Recall that a presumed parent
under PIPA includes a man or woman who for the first two years after
the birth of the child resided in a household with the child and "openly
held out the child [as his or her] . . . own during that time," when the
"child had only one parent under law at that time, and that parent
137. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (West 2013). See also D.C. CODE §16-
831.01(1) (2013) (requiring only "same household at the time of the child's birth or
adoption," with no time period for holding oneself out as parent; if not starting at birth or
adoption, "same household for at least 10 of the 12 months immediately preceding the
filing of the complaint or motion for custody").
138. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. § 8-201(c)(2), (3). The statute was prompted by a child
custody dispute between a birth mother and her former intimate female partner. See
Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920 (Del. 2011) (reviewing legislative history and applying the
newly-enacted statute to recognize former lesbian partner as de facto parent deserving
joint custody with adoptive mother).
139. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-43(a)(4) (West 2013).
140. Id. § 9:17-43(a)(5).
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consented to the . . . holding out." 4 1 Under PIPA, both a temporary and
permanent child support order can be entered against any presumed
parent, thus including one who moved out of the household and ended an
intimate relationship with the biological or adoptive parent twenty-five
months after birth.14 2 Similar support orders seemingly are available
under PLMDMA against an equitable parent, which includes a former
stepparent as well as one "who lived with the child since the child's birth
or for at least 2 years" and held himself (or herself?) out as a parent
under an agreement with one or both of the child's legal parents "to rear
the child together."1 4 3 Because under PIMDMA an equitable parent
generally can only secure an allocation of parental responsibilities but
not an allocation of parenting time,'" should child support guidelines
differ from the guidelines for legal parents who can (or do) secure an
allocation of parental responsibilities? 4 5
F. AHR with No Surrogate?
Yet another question is whether assisted reproduction leading to a
birth without a surrogate-that is, a birth to a woman always intending to
parent-should prompt parentage in her significant other (be it a man or
woman) who always intended to parent, even if the two intended parents
were never in a state-recognized marriage, civil union, or comparable
relationship. As noted, the Illinois Parentage Act now covers only
married heterosexual couples.146 PIPA extends similar parentage
opportunities to same-sex female couples in a civil union as well as to
couples who are not in a state-recognized relationship like a marriage or
civil union.14 7 Elsewhere, as in Texas, a marriage or the like is not
needed, but the statute explicitly contemplates only pacts between an
unmarried man and an unmarried woman. 148
For all current and future couples involved in assisted reproduction
with no surrogate, a related issue is whether a written agreement should
be required. At least some agreeing heterosexual couples are not
expressly covered by the PIPA provisions on assisted reproduction
141. H.B. 1243, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 204(a)(5) (lll. 2013) (man); id. §
204(b)(5) (woman).
142. Id. § 801.
143. H.B. 1452, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 600 (lil. 2013).
144. Id. § 600; id. § 602.5.
145. Id. § 600; id. § 602.5.
146. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/3(a) (West 2013).
147. H.B. 1243 § 703 (stating that person who provides gametes or consents to AHR is
a parent).
148. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.7031(a) (West 2013).
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without a surrogate because there is no proper writing.149 But should a
writing always be needed? If so, what writing forms will withstand a
federal constitutional challenge involving inappropriate waivers of
procreative liberties?o50 A detailed writing requirement that is strictly
enforced would protect against undue encroachments upon a birth
parent's superior childrearing rights, but it would eliminate some loving
relationships between established intended parents and the children they
reared.' 5'
If unwritten consent to parent with the birth mother can prompt a
second parent, there are concerns not only about respecting the birth
mother's superior parental rights but also about whether the second
parent is unduly saddled with child support duties. In New Mexico,
consent by wives and nondonor husbands to parent their wives' children
born of AHR arises without a "signed record" as long as the husband
"functioned as a parent . . . no later than two years after the child's
birth." Can a nonparent function as a parent in an AHR setting without
ever contemplating (or desiring) later parenthood under law?
G. AHR with Surrogate?
As to assisted reproduction with a surrogate, if permitted, must the
intended parent(s) always show "medical need" or gametes contribution?
Both are now required under the Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Act. 53
Parentage intent alone is insufficient. Seemingly excluded from
surrogacy pacts in Illinois today are those with nonmedical needs as well
as a single sterile man, a single sterile woman, and opposite sex and
same sex couples when all partners are sterile. Such restrictions do not
operate in other American states. 154
149. H.B. 1243 § 704(a) (writing includes written ratification of prior oral agreement).
150. See, e.g., Breit v. Mason, 718 S.E.2d 482 (Va. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that even
though statute only recognized parentage in donor husband with gestational wife, it did
not bar unwed father of child born via AHR to unwed mother from petitioning for
parentage).
151. Other issues can arise. See, e.g., J.D.C. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs.,
383 S.W.3d 463 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) (remanding for hearing on whether birth to unwed
mother arose from her self-insemination following her theft of a married man's sperm
from his used condom that she obtained from a garbage can in his garage).
152. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-120(F)(2)(a) (West 2013). See also TEx. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 160.704(b) (West 2013) (stating that husband's failure to sign does not preclude
his establishment as father when he and his wife "openly treated the child as their own").
153. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 47/20(b)(1), (2) (West 2013).
154. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-l1-121(1)(a), (d) (West 2013) (stating that
"intended parent" of a gestational child can be an individual who has no "genetic
relationship with the child" and when there need be only one intended parent). See also
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When permitted, how much leeway for changed minds should
surrogacy statutes recognize? In Utah, courts are authorized to issue
prebirth orders validating gestational agreements and declaring
parenthood in intended parents.155 In Colorado, court orders on parentage
of a "gestational child" are only authorized when the child is born to a
gestational carrier. 15 6 And, when permitted, what additional writing and
other requirements (like demands involving doctors) should attach to
initial surrogacy pacts? 5 7
H. Timing?
As to children born of sex, should intended parentage, in the absence
of traditional adoption or marriage or genetic ties, be able to prompt
parental status if the relevant intent occurred after birth? As noted, PIPA
defines a presumed parent to include a man or woman, with no genetic or
marital or adoptive ties, who for "the first two years after the birth of the
child" resided with and held out the child as one's own with the other
parent's consent.'5 But PIMDMA defines an equitable parent to include
one who "lived with the child since the child's birth or for at least two
years" while holding oneself out as a parent with the consent of the one
or two legal parents.' 59 Even if formal adoption is not necessary for a
presumed or equitable parent who child-reared since birth, should formal
N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-20(1) (2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-121(A) (2013). But
see WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.735 (2013) (only explicitly speaking to parentage of egg
donor via written agreement with gestational carrier). On occasion surrogacy pacts
involving sex, not AHR, are alleged. See, e.g., In re S.N.V., 284 P.3d 147, 148 (Colo.
App. 2011) (addressing competing mother-child relationship claims by both birth mother
and wife of man who allegedly prompted pregnancy via sex pursuant to an unwritten
surrogacy agreement).
155. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-15-802, 803 (West 2013) (placing "discretion in
tribunal," where considerations must include required counseling for all parties;
prohibiting use of gestational mother's eggs; requiring marriage of intended parents; and
requiring that at least one intended parent is a donor). Cf CoLo. REV. STAT. § 15-11-
121(1)-(2) (court order designating "the parent or parents of a gestational child," defined
as "a child born to a gestational carrier under a gestational agreement").
156. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 15-11-121(1)(c), -121(2). See also N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §
30.1-04-20(l)(c), -20(2) (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-121(A)(3), -121(B) (West
2013).
157. The same questions arise for courts reviewing surrogacy arrangements in the
absence of statutes, at least where public policy does not prohibit enforcement of
gestational surrogacy agreements. See, e.g., S.N. v. M.B., 935 N.E.2d 463 (Ohio Ct. App.
2010) (finding that prebirth pact between surrogate and intended mother was valid when
sperm and egg donors were anonymous).
158. H.B. 1243, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 204(a)(5) (Ill. 2013) (man); id. §
204(b)(5) (woman).
159. H.B. 1452, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 600 (Ill. 2013).
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adoption be required of one seeking parental status if his or her
childrearing only began (long) after birth? PIMDMA says no,' 6 0 while
PIPA says yes.161
I. Context?
As questions about parentage law (r)evolution are addressed,
lawmakers in a single state must keep in mind that parental (or parent-
like or special family) status need not be comparably defined in all
contexts. Even today, sometimes parents have no standing to seek
childcare orders (e.g., unfitness or failure to seize the Lehr paternity
opportunity interest), but they continue to have child support
responsibilities.' 6 2 And certain children may be deemed blood-related to
their mothers' husbands for child support purposes but not for crimes
involving "blood" relations between alleged criminals and their
victims.163 As parentage laws evolve, clarity is especially important when
parentage definitions vary by context.
J. Names?
As questions about parentage law (r)evolution are addressed,
lawmakers must also avoid the confusion surrounding word choice.
Often, similar consequences flow in varying American states from
naming certain persons as parents differently, as with the terms de facto
parents, parents by estoppel, legal parents, and presumed parents.
Similar consequences can also flow when custody/visitation is afforded
to a nonparent whose designation can include "de facto custodian."' 64
160. Id.
161. H.B. 1243 § 204(a)(5) (man); id. § 204(b)(5) (woman).
162. See, e.g., Ex parte M.D.C., 39 So. 3d 1117 (Ala. 2009); Porter v. Hill, 835
N.W.2d 247 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013) (finding that though parental rights ended, child
support-including Social Security benefits-continued, but grandparent visitation
standing ended).
163. See, e.g., People v. Zajaczkowski, 825 N.W.2d 554 (Mich. 2012) (finding, in a
criminal case setting, no "blood" relation between brother and sister who had same
biological father for child support purposes, as only in latter setting could biological ties
be presumed).
164. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (West 2013) (specifying "primary caregiver for,
and financial supporter of, a child"), applied in Brumfield v. Stinson, 368 S.W.3d 116
(Ky. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that grandparents cannot be "de facto" custodians, as they
co-parented with natural mother who did not abdicate her role of primary caretaker and
financial supporter), Hicks v. Halsey, 402 S.W.3d 79 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that
maternal aunt is de facto custodian when birth mother was "neither involved nor even
present"), and J.L.A. v. S.C., Nos. 2012-CA-000758-ME, 2012-CA-000937-ME, 2013
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Even in a single state, different names might be used to designate very
comparable, though not entirely similar, interests. Consider the Illinois
Family Law Study Committee's proposals, with PIMDMA's recognition
of both legal and equitable parents and PIPA's recognition of biological,
adoptive, acknowledged, and presumed parents. Seemingly, if both
proposals are adopted as now proposed, PIPA recognitions of parenthood
would also prompt legal parenthood, not equitable parenthood, under
PIMDMA. And in Delaware, seemingly many stepparents would have
standing to seek childcare orders either as stepparents' 65 or as de facto
parents' 66 if they were living with the custodial parents of the children.
Likewise, as to names, traditionally presumed paternity operated to
vest parentage in certain husbands, with a general understanding
developed over time that such husbands varied in definition from state to
state, even though all presumptions were thought to be grounded in
probabilities about male biological ties tied to births arising from sex.
Today, some statutory paternity presumptions remain traditional while
others require neither biological ties nor address only births arising from
sex. For example, some courts have read presumed paternity statutes to
encompass as parents those who could never have had relevant sex.' 6 7
Here, the term presumed parent can be confusing.
K. Consents to Shared or Waived Parental Rights?
As to parentage for all children regardless of the circumstances of
conception, a central question-likely to be first and foremost in many
instances-is how a recognized parent might consent to sharing
parenthood with another, or how a recognized or potential parent might
waive altogether either of the two forms of parental rights described in
Lehr-the "substantial" federal constitutional childrearing interests and
the parental opportunity interests. Shared parentage should be
distinguished from waived parentage, as only the latter constitutes a
WL 843815 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2013) (holding that both grandparents were primary
caregivers and financial supporters).
165. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 733 (West 2013) (specifying that "upon the death or
disability of the custodial or primary placement parent," residential stepparent may seek
"permanent custody or primary physical placement" even when "there is a surviving
natural parent").
166. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (West 2013) (finding a de facto parent if, with
"the support and consent of the child's parent or parents," the person "exercised parental
responsibility for the child" and "acted in a parental role" that prompted "a bonded and
dependent relationship with the child that is parental in nature").
167. See, e.g., In re Domestic P'ship of C.P. & D.F., No. E052672, 2013 WL 2099156,
at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. May 16, 2013) (noting statutory presumption of natural ties in a child
born of sex in a female partner of the birth mother).
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complete loss of parental childcare rights, even if a resurrection of lost
rights is possible and even if child support obligations are not ended.
Further, the circumstances constituting sharing or waiving parental rights
might be varied depending, inter alia, on whether a parental right arose
for a child born of sex, born of AHR with no surrogate, or born of AHR
with a surrogate. Only in the latter two settings are there often contracts
guiding any later shared or waived rights.
Of course, parental rights arising from federal constitutional
precedents might be defined, shared, or waived differently than
additional parental rights arising from, for example, state laws. Thus,
even when the federal constitutional interests of children are unavailable
or lost, non-constitutional parental interests may still arise.'68
For a child born of sex, the "substantial" childrearing interests of an
unwed birth mother may be deemed shared via, for example, consent
within a de facto (or comparable) parenthood law recognizing similar
interests in a nonbiological and nonadoptive parent, like the mother's
live-in boyfriend or girlfriend. Here, where only two parents may be
recognized for a single child, the unwed biological father's parental
opportunity interest often is lost with such consent. Such consent may be
subject to inference from conduct that does not actually constitute a
knowing, voluntary, and informed choice as to sharing legal parenthood,
like when a parent does not object to his/her intimate partner helping out
with the kids around their house.' 6 9
Nonparent childcare interests over later parental objections are
generally recognized in South Dakota when a "parent's presumptive
right to custody" is earlier lost due to forfeiture or surrender of parental
rights to a nonparent. A narrower, though still broad, statute in
168. Thus, while there is no presumptive federal constitutional Due Process right to
counsel for indigent persons in termination of parental rights proceedings, such a right to
counsel sometimes arises under state statute, as in Minnesota. In re Welfare of G.L.H.,
614 N.W.2d 718, 720 n.2 (Minn. 2000) (comparing Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452
U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981), with MINN. STAT. § 260.155 (2) (1998)).
169. Professor Carbone has suggested that both married and unmarried couples
intending to parent should, "shortly after the child's birth," make a commitment in "a
ceremony modeled on christening." June Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood:
Uncertainty at the Core of Family Identity, 65 LA. L. REV. 1295, 1344 (2005). Professor
Harris has suggested that the voluntary acknowledgment process be broadened to include
intended parents in same sex relationships with no biological or adoptive ties. Harris
supra note 48, at 487-88. With Zachary Townsend, I have earlier called for such
expansion to include prebirth acknowledgments (which could be used to sustain prebirth
child support orders). Parness & Townsend, supra note 8, at 96-98.
170. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-29(2) (2013). While broadly written, the provision
has been narrowly read. See Veldheer v. Peterson, 824 N.W.2d 86, 94-96 (S.D. 2012)
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Kentucky recognizes similar interests in a "de facto custodian," defined
as one who was "the primary caregiver," "financial supporter," and
resident in a home with the child for at least six months when the child
was under three.171 In Montana, parental interests can be awarded to a
nonparent when "the natural parent has engaged in conduct that is
contrary to the child-parent relationship." 7 2 Elsewhere there are general
statutes, as with guardianships,17 3 and special statutes, as with laws on
former stepparents.174
For a child bom of AHR with no surrogate, there are often formal
consents to waiving any form of parental rights, like those in Lehr
involving the sperm donor, especially when another, like the birth
mother's husband or female spouse or male or female intimate partner,
has consented to assume childrearing responsibilities. Likewise, here the
birth mother has consented to sharing parenthood, so there is a reduction
in her unilateral rights regarding childcare decisions.175
For a child born of AHR with a surrogate, the birth mother typically
consents preconception to waiving all parental interests, while a gametes
donor often consents to shared parenthood with a non-donorl 7 6 when the
surrogacy pact anticipates two intended parents.
Consents to sharing or waiving parental rights in AHR settings may
need to be in writing, as with surrogacy pacts. Here the implications of
signing are usually recognized by the signatories. Yet, consents to shared
parental rights in de facto parenthood settings can arise from non-
(finding no loss of custody even though grandparents served as primary caretakers for
approximately two years).
171. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (West 2013) (requiring residence for at least one
year if the child is over three).
172. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-228(2)(a), construed in Kulstad v. Maniaci, 220 P.3d
595 (Mont. 2009) (finding requirement met when adoptive mother "ceded her exclusive
authority" to her lesbian partner from the time of adoption to the end of their intimate
relationship). See also In re Parenting of M.M.G., 287 P.3d 952 (Mont. 2012) (finding
that birth mother may have "ceded" authority to a couple she met at a gas station when
the child was one when the couple primarily cared for the child for about ten years before
the mother announced that she was moving out of state).
173. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of S.H., 409 S.W.3d 307 (Ark. 2012) (holding that fit
mother who consented to paternal grandparent guardianship could move to terminate
guardianship without needing to show best interests).
174. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.119(3) (West 2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
124-1 (West 2013).
175. See, e.g., Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that
birth mother acts in a manner inconsistent with her constitutionally protected status when
she invites female domestic partner to coparent and partner so acts, as determined when
the couple later separated).
176. Of course, there are consent standards for such non-donors, but they do not
involve sharing or waiving existing parental rights.
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contractual conduct involving, for example, creations of "unitary"
families, where the implications regarding parental rights may not always
be recognized. There is little case law on such non-contractual consents
by conduct in AHR settings, with statutes sometimes providing few
guidelines.177
L. Parentage Tiers?
Under PIMDMA and some existing American state laws, there can
be parentage tiers where one class of parents (like the PIMDMA "legal
parent") has more rights (like the PIMDMA distinction between
allocations of parenting responsibilities and parenting time) than another
class of parents (like the PIMDMA "equitable parent"). Seemingly,
different classes of parents also can have different parental
responsibilities (as with child support). Are tiers or gradations of legal
parentage wise? To date, different sources of parentage-as via biology
and adoption-have often been treated comparably, as in childcare
settings.178 But where there are tiers, might even three or more classes be
recognized? 7 9  And should further parentage tiers be primarily
established by statutes rather than precedents? 80
A lower-level parentage tier could include a class of persons whose
parentage interests are conditional. For example, the tier could recognize
biological fathers of children born to unwed mothers when the men lost
their parental opportunity interests under Lehr through no conduct
exhibiting a significant disinterest in parenthood, as when a man did not
consciously fail to file with a putative father registry even though such a
177. Statutes on consents by contract can be vague. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-1
(West 2013) (stating that "parental power" involving child "control" can be "lost by ...
voluntary contract releasing the right to a third person"). See also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
25-5-29 (2013) (setting forth that presumptive control of a child in a parent is "rebutted
by proof ... [t]hat the parent has forfeited or surrendered his or her parental rights . . . to
any person other than the parent").
178. See, e.g., Hastings v. Hastings, 732 S.E.2d 272 (Ga. 2012) (finding that adoptive
parent is treated like a biological parent when the two dispute childcare when wife had
adopted husband's biological son during marriage).
179. ALI Principles § 2.03 recognizes the possibilities of a legal parent, a parent by
estoppel, and a de facto parent. These principles have not been generally adopted by
American states. Michael R. Clisham & Robin Fretwell Wilson, American Law Institute's
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, Eight Years After Adoption: Guiding
Principles or Obligatory Footnote?, 42 FAM. L.Q. 573 (2008).
180. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 93 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(disapproving "judicially defined gradations of other persons (grandparents, extended
family, adoptive family in an adoption later found to be invalid, long-term guardians,
etc.)" who have childcare claims against parental wishes).
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file failure eliminated his voice in an adoption proceedings'8 or when a
man did not provide (sufficient) prebirth support to the prospective
mother whose location he did not know.' 82 Here, there might be deemed
a tier embodying resurrected parental interests.'8 3
As well, preferences on future parentage might be afforded to certain
persons, perhaps limited to family members, who had earlier developed
parental-like relationships with children who lose their parents through
death or perhaps otherwise. To some extent, such preferences are already
recognized in current adoption laws involving parentless children who
are to be placed, if possible, with relatives or with a certain
community. 184
VI. CONCLUSION
American state parentage laws have evolved significantly in the past
half-century in response to changes in both reproductive technologies
and human conduct. Yet further evolution, if not a revolution, seems
inevitable. In particular, American state laws increasingly recognize
parenthood by consent for a nonbiological and nonadoptive parent-like
figure in an intimate or familial relationship with a child's biological or
adoptive parent. Lawmakers, especially state legislators,' 85 will need to
consider who may be granted standing as parents to seek court-ordered
181. See, e.g., Heidbreder v. Carton, 645 N.W.2d 355 (Minn. 2002) (sustaining
Minnesota adoption over unwed biological father's objection because he did not file with
Minnesota parenting registry within thirty days after birth, though he filed in Minnesota
thirty-one days after birth on the very day he had learned the mother had moved from
Iowa to Minnesota and had given birth in Minnesota and even though the mother had
earlier told him she would not offer the child for adoption).
182. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1989) (finding insufficient
failure to support prebirth by unwed biological father who did not know his pregnant
girlfriend's whereabouts for much of her pregnancy), questioned in Jeffrey A. Parness,
Prospective Fathers and Their Unborn Children, 13 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L. REV. 165,
166-71 (1991).
183. Consider as well conditional parentage interests in men whose children are later
discovered some time after the children were abandoned by birth mothers under a safe
haven law. See, e.g., In re Commitment of Baby Girl Hope, 932 N.Y.S.2d 832 (N.Y.
Fam. Ct. 2011).
184. See, e.g., Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C.A. § 1902 (West 2013) (stating that
placement of Indian children for adoption should "reflect the unique values of Indian
culture").
185. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Z., 724 A.2d 1035, 1060 (Conn. 1999)
(deferring, on lesbian's attempt to adopt partner's child born of AHR, to the "legislature,
as elected representatives of the people" because the legislature "[has] the power and
responsibility to establish the requirements for adoption in this state. The courts simply
cannot play that role").
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childcare, including former stepparents, former boyfriends and
girlfriends, and present and former grandparents. As well, whether
standing should be granted to three or more possible parents must be
pondered, as must issues on how consent to a new parent might be given
outside of formal adoption by both a recognized parent and by an
intended parent, including whether a formal declaration should be
required, as via a voluntary acknowledgment or guardianship, and
whether household residence or a particular length of actual childcare
should be demanded.
Given the likely continuing changes in human conduct (as with more
same sex marriages) and technologies (as with prebirth paternity testing),
American parentage laws will undoubtedly continue to be further
(r)evolutionized, presenting even more challenges for American state
lawmakers.
